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Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, by John Borrows
Abstract
The metaphor of Justice McEachern - the trial judge in the famous Aboriginal title case Delgamuukw—and
his “tin ear” is useful in describing the disconnect between settler law and Aboriginal ways of life. We have
seen this tin ear time and again in our legal system, whether it’s the inability of Canadian evidentiary laws to
accept oral Indigenous evidence or the difficulty judges have in applying Gladue principles to the sentencing
of Aboriginal offenders. We have seen it in the reluctance of courts to recognize Aboriginal spirituality under
the Charter and in the narrow framing of section 35 of the Constitution, a framing that has only reaffirmed the
settler belief that Indigenous peoples are “‘once-upon-a-time’ groups that can only occupy a very narrow space
in contemporary democracies.” John Borrows new book, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, explores
the quest for freedom (dibenindizowin) and a good life (mino-bimaadiziwin) for Indigenous peoples in
Canada, and what stands in the way of achieving it. As Borrows explains, freedom is not just the “absence of
coercion or constraint.” It is the ability, alongside others, to “choose, create, resist, reject, and change laws and
policies that affect your life.” Unsurprisingly, one of the main barriers is the law’s continued inability to attune
itself to Indigenous values, wishes, and beliefs. At every turn, Canadian-European legal traditions have
remained inattentive— and sometimes even indifferent—when Indigenous peoples have fought for freedom.
We once again see the tin ear of the law. Borrows’ book is a careful call to arms; a thoughtful manifesto on how
to resist, litigate, protest, and educate in search of a space where Indigenous peoples may live freely and pursue
a good life most in line with their own dreams and aspirations.
This book review is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol54/iss3/11
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Book Review
Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, 
by John Borrows1
LILLIANNE CADIEUX-SHAW2
Chief Justice Allan McEachern: I don’t want to be skeptical, but to have witnesses singing 
songs in court is, in my respectful view, not the proper way to approach this problem.
Mr. Grant: Well, my Lord, with respect, the song is what one may refer to as a death song. 
It’s a song which invokes the history of and the depth of the history of what she is telling.
McEachern: I have a tin ear, Mr. Grant, so it’s not going to do any good to sing it to me.
Transcript, Delgamuukw v The Queen, 1991.3
THE METAPHOR OF JUSTICE MCEACHERN—the trial judge in the famous 
Aboriginal title case Delgamuukw—and his “tin ear” is useful in describing the 
disconnect between settler law and Aboriginal ways of life. We have seen this 
tin ear time and again in our legal system, whether it’s the inability of Canadian 
evidentiary laws to accept oral Indigenous evidence or the difficulty judges 
1. John Borrows, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2016).
2. JD 2017, Osgoode Hall Law School.
3. John Sutton Lutz, Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2008) at 276. See also Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1991] 5 CNLR 5, 
79 DLR (4th) (BCSC).
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have in applying Gladue principles to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders.4 
We have seen it in the reluctance of courts to recognize Aboriginal spirituality 
under the Charter5 and in the narrow framing of section 35 of the Constitution, 
a framing that has only reaffirmed the settler belief that Indigenous peoples 
are “‘once-upon-a-time’ groups that can only occupy a very narrow space in 
contemporary democracies.”6
John Borrows new book, Freedom & Indigenous Constitutionalism, explores 
the quest for freedom (dibenindizowin) and a good life (mino-bimaadiziwin) 
for Indigenous peoples in Canada, and what stands in the way of achieving it. 
As Borrows explains, freedom is not just the “absence of coercion or constraint.”7 
It is the ability, alongside others, to “choose, create, resist, reject, and change laws 
and policies that affect your life.”8 Unsurprisingly, one of the main barriers is the 
law’s continued inability to attune itself to Indigenous values, wishes, and beliefs. 
At every turn, Canadian-European legal traditions have remained inattentive—
and sometimes even indifferent—when Indigenous peoples have fought for 
freedom. We once again see the tin ear of the law. Borrows’ book is a careful call 
to arms; a thoughtful manifesto on how to resist, litigate, protest, and educate in 
search of a space where Indigenous peoples may live freely and pursue a good life 
most in line with their own dreams and aspirations.
Each chapter of Borrows’ book outlines a different path for carving out this 
space, and each path rests on Anishinaabe laws and stories to make the point. 
In exploring these paths for freedom and the quest for a good life, Borrows is 
careful to note the dangers these paths can lead to—he warns that, “like the 
trickster, freedom can wear many false faces.”9 Freedom is not the ability to do 
anything we want, nor is there one path to the good life that we should all force 
ourselves along. Freedom and the good life are a “living tradition” that we create 
on an ongoing basis, facilitated by Indigenous legal practices and relationships 
within a community. Freedom is resistance against that which confines Indigenous 
4. For an exploration of the use of oral evidence in the courts, see Bruce Granville Miller, Oral 
History on Trial: Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2013). For a review of how Saskatchewan judges have been giving overly-harsh sentences 
for Aboriginal offenders, see James TD Scott, “Reforming Saskatchewan’s Biased Sentencing 
Regime” Saskatoon Criminal Defence Lawyers Association (2014), online: <spmlaw.ca/scdla/
JimScott_sentencing_bias_2014.pdf>.
5. Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2015 
BCCA 352, 387 DLR (4th) 10.
6. Borrows, supra note 1 at 13.
7. Ibid at 12.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid at 17.
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peoples “within essentialized, authentic categories and frameworks.”10 With this 
in mind, Borrows explores a number of different paths that may get us there.
The first chapter, or path, explores the idea of mobility, an integral tenet in 
Indigenous peoples’ pursuit of freedom. This means both mobility in a physical 
sense, with the ability to move freely across the countries Indigenous groups 
have traditionally called home, and mobility in an intellectual sense, with the 
ability to move “across the broad world of ideas.”11 Legal systems have often used 
mobility against Indigenous peoples: If they are too nomadic, the state will try to 
narrow and confine, or say that title has not been established through connection 
to a specific space. But if they are too static (in time, for instance), courts will 
limit rights and block Indigenous journeys through time, mired as they are in 
stereotypes of Indigenous groups as “past-tense peoples.”12
In this, I am reminded of Cherokee writer Thomas King’s hilarious discussion 
of authenticity, and how the Canadian state has taken upon itself the task of 
determining what is truly Indigenous and what is not. King writes:
For us Live Indians, being invisible is annoying enough, but being inauthentic is 
crushing. If it will help, I’m willing to apologize for the antenna on that house at 
Acoma. I’ve already shaved off my moustache, so that should no longer be an issue. 
If I didn’t live in the middle of a city, I’d have a horse. Maybe two. I sing with a drum 
group. I’ve been to sweats. I have friends on a number of reservations and reserves 
around North America. I’m diabetic. If you can think of something else I can do to 
help myself, let me know.13
Borrows picks up on this idea (and continues to do so throughout the 
book), writing that courts have often fallen for an “exceedingly narrow view of 
who constitutes an authoritative Indigenous person, and thus what qualifies as 
Indigenous tradition.”14 To prevent this essentializing, and to further freedom of 
mobility through time and physical space, Borrows urges us to “recognize and 
affirm Indigenous patterns of mobility,” so that courts, judges, and the public are 
aware of the stereotypical and limiting views of Indigenous mobility currently 
being perpetuated.15 Further, Borrows recommends first that Indigenous peoples 
be given the freedom to regulate their own communities and integrate others 
into it themselves; this would avoid “freez[ing] ideas about who is authentically 
10. Ibid at 129.
11. Ibid at 13.
12. Ibid at 33.
13. Thomas King, The Inconvenient Indian: A Curious Account of Native People in North America 
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012) at 64.
14. Borrows, supra note 1 at 34.
15. Ibid at 39.
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Indigenous.”16 Second, he recommends that Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
laws be harmonized, spreading Indigenous legal traditions among Canadian 
society and broadening Indigenous paths of mobility.
A second path to freedom focuses on civil “(dis)obedience” (with the 
brackets reflecting that what you are disobeying is a matter of perspective; 
Indigenous disobedience to settler laws can just as easily be viewed as obedience 
to Indigenous legal traditions). In this chapter, Borrows reviews a number of 
Canadian examples of Indigenous groups using blockades and direct action to 
fight for their rights. Some examples show where civil disobedience has been 
an effective practice, achieving both short- and long-term success. Others show 
where civil disobedience was not successful in the short-term but did provide 
some long-term benefits. Still other examples show where civil disobedience has 
backfired, failing to “open up any meaningful democratic space, [and] thereby 
further eroding Indigenous freedom.”17 Borrows collects lessons to be learned 
from these examples for those who may wish to use civil disobedience as a tool 
for reform in the future.
A third path for reform is through resistance to and engagement with 
Canada’s constitution and its formation. Specifically, Canada’s constitutional 
formation is founded on the importance of a ‘free and democratic’ society 
and on the importance of the constitution as a “perpetual work in progress,” 
as emphasized by the living tree doctrine.18 But Indigenous peoples have been 
left out of this ongoing formation. The effects of colonialism are ever-present, 
even today. And the constitution has never been a welcoming document—
constitutional entrenchment looked, to many Indigenous peoples at the time, 
as a shackle rather than a tool for freedom. Most legislation had been adverse to 
Indigenous aspirations, after all. Despite this, Indigenous peoples have been, and 
should continue to be, engaged in the constitutional formation of our country.
Branching off slightly from this path allows us to stumble upon a similar 
but distinct barrier to freedom: (Ab)originalism, a play on words referring to the 
courts’ use of originalism as an interpretive principle when it comes to interpreting 
Aboriginal rights.19 This reveals Canada’s “interpretive inconsistency”20—that is 
to say, courts in Canada have vocally committed themselves to the living tree 
16. Ibid at 42.
17. Ibid at 53.
18. Ibid at 105.
19. Borrows first explored this idea in an article written for Osgoode’s Constitutional Cases 
conference. See “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev 351.
20. Borrows, supra note 1 at 15.
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doctrine of constitutional interpretation, where our constitution is interpreted 
with a mind to the future change and growth of society … except when it comes 
to Aboriginal rights. Section 35, in particular, has been interpreted in such a way 
as to freeze Aboriginal traditions in time, relying on an originalist interpretation 
that isn’t used for any other kind of constitutional interpretation. Borrows explores 
the troubling line of section 35 jurisprudence highlighting this interpretation, 
arguing that it rests on the assumption that the rights protected in section 35 
must belong to some “pre-existing historical essence.”21 Borrows provides three 
key alternatives for the courts in interpreting Aboriginal rights. While this is an 
insightful chapter, it does not engage with originalism beyond the Aboriginal 
context, nor does it engage with other academic critiques highlighting where 
originalism has shown its face in other places.22 This doesn’t fully contextualize 
originalism in the Canadian constitutional context. Still, Borrows provides 
compelling examples where Aboriginal rights have sometimes been unduly 
narrowed and framed by an originalist interpretation.
A fourth path to freedom is through legislation that can help advance 
Indigenous self-determination in Canada, though Borrows is quick to caution 
that this must be done carefully; legislation has historically been a dark cloud 
over the path to Indigenous peoples living free and good lives (the Indian Act 
being a prime example).23 Borrows looks to the United States for some examples 
of legislation that gives more Indigenous control over services, that protects 
Indigenous cultures and communities, and that allows Indigenous control over 
natural resources and economic development.24
Lastly, freedom and a good life must be sought through focused effort on 
addressing violence against Indigenous women. Specifically, Borrows returns to 
his concern about how section 35 has been framed. It has been overly focused 
on land and resource conflicts at the sacrifice of protecting human rights issues 
such as the shocking violence Indigenous women experience in Canada. Borrows 
recommends that section 35 be put to work, providing both constitutional 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ bodies and a right to self-govern, so that 
21. Ibid at 141.
22. See e.g. Leonid Sirota & Benjamin J Oliphant, “Originalist Reasoning in Canadian 
Constitutional Jurisprudence” (17 March 2016) Working Draft, online: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2749224>. See also Kerri A Froc, “Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious 
Case of Canada’s “Equal Rights Amendment” (2014) 19:2 Rev Const Stud 237.
23. For an overview of the origins and impact of the Indian Act, see generally, Ken Coates, “The 
Indian Act and the Future of Aboriginal Governance in Canada” (May 2008) National Centre 
for First Nations Governance, online: <fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/coates.pdf>.
24. Supra note 1 at 166.
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Indigenous groups may properly address the violence in their own communities. 
Indigenous governments must be allowed responsibility for the “health, safety, 
and well-being of their members.”25 This view stems from Borrows’ argument 
that violence against Indigenous women should particularly be addressed through 
a “jurisdictional perspective,” which would give Indigenous communities the 
constitutional power to deal with the inequalities exacerbating this violence.26 
It would have been interesting for Borrows to explore other mechanisms for 
addressing violence against Indigenous women, perhaps through a properly 
executed criminal law—this would focus more on enforcement rather than 
constitutionalism and jurisdiction. Borrows is quick to note, however, that this 
troubling issue is one that “must be confronted at all levels of society.”27
It is hard to say where Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism fits within 
similar literature because Borrows has created such a unique book, simultaneously 
philosophical and practical, both a legal treatise in its own right and an ode to 
Anishinaabe traditions. It is a well-researched and thought-provoking critique of 
colonialism, but its greatest contribution is its thoughtful solutions for moving 
ahead, for carving out paths in the fresh snow so that others may follow, for 
suggesting ways to create a country that respects the freedom and quest for a 
good life that our country’s first peoples are fighting for.
In light of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s findings, we are all 
becoming more aware of the history of our country, a “history of broken promises. 
Of illness and death. The loss of land. The indignity of colonization.”28 As such, 
Borrows’ book will be a powerful read for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
readers alike. It is for those interested in Borrows’ academic arguments about 
(ab)originalism or for those interested in the practical arguments about civil (dis)
obedience, for those who want to find new tools to dismantle the master’s house 
or those looking for new uses of old tools. It is a book for those that may be 
frustrated by the law’s tin ear, and for those that want to play a role in attuning 
our country’s laws so that they may more fully listen, understand, and respond 
to Indigenous peoples in their quest for freedom and a good life. I encourage 
all to read it.
25. Ibid at 202.
26. Ibid at 204.
27. Ibid.
28. R v Sledz, 2017 ONCJ 151 at para 16, 2017 CarswellOnt 3692.
